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"The Inflation of an Overdone Business"

The Economic Origins of
San Francisco Vigilantes
by Robert M. Senkewicz
Although most Americans would probably spontaneously associate
the word --vigilante·· with the wild west, cattle theives , range wars, and
the like. the largest vigilante movement in American history was urban
in location and commercial in character. In San Francisco in the
summer of 1856, six thousand vigilantes, led by the city' s mercantile
upper crust, established a de facto government. Claiming that crime was
too often unpunished and politics too often corrupt, the importers and
wholesale merchants of San Francisco organized a private police force
which hanged four men and forced another thirty or so to leave the city.
(Contemporary San Franciscans would doubtless agree that this was
heavy punishment indeed!) The businessmen claimed that they were
reluctant vigilantes, public-minded citizens forced by crisis to step
outside the letter of the law to preserve its spirit. "The voice of a whole
people," stated the vigilantes in a public address, ·'demanded union and
organization as the only means of making our laws effective. " 1
For about a century, most historians tended to accept the vigilantes'
version of events. Recently, however, a series of investigations has cast
serious doubt on the vigilante picture of gold rush San Francisco as a
crime-ridden and corrupt city. It is now fairly clear that, in fact, there
was no crime wave which forced supposedly virtuous citizens to resort to
lynch law. Nor does it seem that the political life of the city was terribly
corrupt and venal, even by nineteenth century standards. Current
scholars are therefore casting about for alternative explanations of San
Francisco vigilantism. There is little agreement among them. Roger
Lotchin, for instance, attempts to preserve a variant of the ' ·public
interest" interpretation. In his view, San Francisco vigilantism was an
effort of the self-perceived '·legitimates" to impose stability and order on
the .. colorful, lawless metropolis." Peter Decker takes a more grouporiented view. He maintains that the businessmen-vigilantes were
attempting to ·'maintain if not regain, occupational status. " Richard
Maxwell Brown, the leading historian of American vigilantism,
somewhat combines the two approaches by arguing that the vigilantes
were interested in restoring "confidence in San Francisco' s municipal
and financial stability. " 2 But there has been as yet little systematic effort
to relate the structure of the market in which San Francisco businessmen
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operated to the phenomenon of organized violence. In my view, this is
unfortunate, for the vigilantes' actions are largely explainable by the
terms of such an investigation.
The 1856 San Francisco committee of vigilance deserves study, for it
was perhaps the pre-eminent nineteenth century example of urban
violence directed by .. gent lemen of property and standing ... The ease
and success with which San Francisco busi nessmen organized political
vio lence for economic purposes underscores the essential fragility of the
political order in nineteenth century America and highlights its
vulnerability to economic pressure groups acting in the name of political
"reform. '' 3
Much has been written on the famous gold rush, but equally important
for early San Francisco was a kind of"hustler rush.'' as young men from
the east. determined to pocket the gold the miners were extracting
swarmed into the collection of shanties, wharves , and rotting ships (the
latter two often the same!) that was the gold rush city . Unable to fashion
a commercial environment that would support them in the style to which
they fondly hoped to become accustomed , these first generation
importers tended to become vigilantes in a last ditch attempt to render a
stubborn market benevolent.
Edward T. Hosmer was somewhat representative of thi s first
generation . Almost as soon as word of the gold discoveries reached him
he left his home in upstate New York. and travelled to Albany and New
York City, contacting friends of his father and gathering from them a
cargo to take with him to San Francisco. He also made arrangements
with a commission merchant in New York to send him goods on a
regular bassis after his arrival in California. When he arrived in San
Francisco, he carefu ll y toured the city, seeking persons from New York
with whom he might be able to establish a business relationship . By the
end of 1849 , he reported in a letter to his parents, ··The firm of Hosmer
and Co. is A No. I here ... goods are ordered from New York to the care
of Hos mer and Co. by a number of our friends . " 4
Alfred A. Dibblee was a New England version of the same
phenomenon . In Boston he collected assorted merchandi se from friends
of the family and established permanent lines of communication
between San Francisco and Massachusetts. When he arrived in San
Francisco, he met a man named Chicester, a brother-in- law of William
Harbeck, a large Boston shipper. The two formed a partnership. and,
after Chicester retired from business. Dibblee arranged to retain the
Harbeck account. This, together with his own Boston relationship.
afforded him a good business. 5
These two men were joined by many others, and their combined
presence gave a frenzied commercial tone to the life of early San
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Franci sco. Some participants were wildly optimistic. "If one has
moderate capital." wrote a '49er, "he can make money fast.'' In the
same vein a few years later a teamster wrote his wife . .. I came here to
make some thing. and I mean to. ,. But others were le ss sanguine . An
1851 businessman described the city as "This land of strangers, where
nothing but the merciless grasp of the money getter greets you o n every
side ... Hosmer could a lso see the darker side of the coin:·· Friends are of
but little service. Every body is intent on making money, and have but
little time to talk without they are well paid for it. '' 6
A good dose of pessimi sm was warranted, for the overblown
expectation s which the hustlers brought with them soon bumped up
against reality. It was not easy to do business in the urban frontier. Not
surprisingly in view of commercial intelligence was s low to develop. An
enduring pattern of chaos was set before California had been admitted
into the Union. In early 1849. merchant Henry F. Teschenmacher
wrote to Boston, ·' It would be impossible to say what kinds of a cargo
would sel l well in six months from now. as vesse ls are expected from all
parts of the world ... However, scarcely one month later, the same
Boston business establishment heard from another correspondent. ·· A
cargo well assorted to consist principally of eatab les and houses and
furniture will pay a good profit.,. With such conflicting estimates at
hand. the natural tendency of shippers was to send whatever they cou ld
and hope for the best. As a result, early San Francisco was ge nerally
inundated with more merchandise than could be sold and oversupply
was the basic condition of the market. An 1851 newspaper iss ued a
complaint that was to permeate the commercial correspondence of the
period when it stated, "Now we find our markets broken down with
merchand ise from the Eastern states. " A ship captain who arrived at
San Francisco early in the same year reported that the market was
--extremely du ll ... the whole country is full of goods and large arrivals
are expected.--:
This condition, which one merchant termed "the inflation of an
overdone business,'· appears to have been the basi c condition of the San
Fran cisco market except for parts of 1852 and 1853 . In 1851. for
instance . one merchant grumbled. "There is enough lumber to last for
five years, and though many fortunes have been lost by shippin g it here
(for very few shipments that have arrived here for a year past have paid
expenses, let alone first costs) yet it is st ill se nt in hope of a raise ... An
Anon ymo us correspondent took o ut his frustration s. and probably those
of many merchants. by sending a satirical letter to the Herald in which
he "advi sed" eastern suppliers to send imm ed iately "five hundred
assorted cargoes. as the supply in th e mark et is not suffice int for more
than fifteen months ... He continued. --Any article quoted at hi gh price s.
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the consumption of which is limited, should be shipped in large
quantities, in order to compete with the host of other shippers. " Such
"advices" finally had some effect, although only a temporary one, in
1852. In March, merchant-vigilante Robert S. Lammot wrote to his
father, "There is a better show of prices than I have known for two years.
The market is more steady and settled. " 8
But by early 185 3 the market was again full . Early that year, a
commission house reported to a dealer in Chile that barley was abundant
at San Francisco, and that any shipments would result in losses, " unless
the price improves soon. " The news that a large shipment of flour was on
the way created a temporary panic, as holders frantically tried to unload
their stocks before the fleet arrived. By the end of March, merchants
were advising suppliers of Chile flour that " Chile produce can be sold
only for a loss, " and recommending " great caution in making shipments
for some months to come." By January 1854 some of the smaller
importers, caught with large amounts of goods , failed . Even one of the
larger dealers complained, " No one can make a calculation on this
market. " By March business was reported " as dull as it can be," and
advice was passed along " not to send either flour or barley here , unless
there should be an actual failure of crops here , which is not likely to
happen. " In June, a teamster, whose own livelihood was tied up with the
general state of the market, put the matter more succinctly, observing
" We don' t need supplies here of scarce anything. " 9
By February and March of the next year, Chile dealers were being
advised in increasingly shrill terms not to send any more flour, since, for
what must have been the umpteenth time , '' whilst goods continue to
arrive in large quantities , prices must give way. " A lawyer observed,
"Times are excessively gloomy here ... no one doing well except the
lawyers ." The overabundance of goods , combined with a series of bank
failures in February 1855 , led one San Francisco commission merchant
to report, " The whole country is for sale." In the middle of 185 5, a
laborer who was having difficulty finding work complained, "' Things
have fell off so every day there is some merchant fails that was supposed
to be well off The palmy days of California are over." By March, 1856,
one paper offered this gloomy assessment:
The truth is th a t with very fe w e xceptio ns we are overstoc ked with impo rted merc handi se.
and so me fifte e n or twe nty ship s a re kn own to be within a fe w da ys· sa il of us . whi ch wi ll
quite rati ona ll y account fo r the e xi sting dull state of busi ness . .. an d it is qu ite as rat ional to
believe th at there will be no impro ve ment until th e heavy stoc ks a re worked off JO

In attempting to deal with depressed business conditions. the first
generation San Francisco importers had a limited number of options.
One involved trying to bypass the middlemen, the jobbers, and inducing
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the merchants in the interior of the state into larger purchases by the
lower prices the importers could then offer. But his option, sporadically
adopted, proved inconvenient. The importers had all they could do in
trying to manage the external trade, without bothering themselves with
the intricacies of the Sacramento or Marysville markets. Thus, they
were generally forced to deal with the jobbers, despite the fact that the
jobbers consistently frustrated them by buying only what they were
absolutely certain they could sell. As an 1855 paper remarked, "The
jobbers have strictly limited their purchases to their actual wants from
day to day." 11
Another option involved the formation of primitive cartels, through
which the importers attempted to hold a particular item until the jobbers
met their asking price. The historical sources are filled with tales of such
efforts, which generally ended in failure. In July 1853, for instance, a
group of importers temporarily managed to run up the price offlour, only
to be beaten by the large ve,lume of imports which arrived by the end of
the summer. In January 1854, another group worked up the price of
coffee, but that effort collapsed in less than a month. Flour cartels were
tried, again unsuccessfully, in 1855 and 1856. 12
The cartels were defeated by the nature of economic conditions.
There were simply too many would-be commercial magnates importing
too much merchandise into California. Some were obviously stronger
than the others, with better credit ratings in the east and a greater ability
to absorb temporary losses. But, unfortunately for others, steam
dominated the transportation network to the east. Every two weeks a
steamer left San Francisco, and on these regular departure days, weaker
importers needed cash to remit to their suppliers. So the temptation to
try to break the cartel and make a killing proved consistently irresistable.
As one paper put it:
Experience in this market has amply demonstrated the fact that with a six months ' stock of
any staple article in the hands of a hundred different holders, prices cannot be maintained
at a standard covering the cost of production or manufacture. Chiefly for the reason that
one-third to one-half the number of operators have not the means to hold for a sufficient
length of time. but are ob liged prematurely to realize , in order to raise money, and thereby
break down the market. This result to specu lation without any proper basis has been
13
witnessed again and again.

These frequent "speculations" point to a spotty tradition which the
San Francisco merchants possessed by the spring of 1856 of attempting
common action to solve their commercial problems. The failure of so
many of the speculations points to the mixed results which such efforts
achieved. In general, the merchants were able to act in concert with
some degree of success only when they acted against an outside
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adversary, and they were generally unable to act in concert when a
problem stemmed from within their own ranks.
Prior to 185 6, the most spectacular example of mercantile cooperation against outside adversaries had been the 1851 vigilance
committee. A group of merchants, outraged at what they considered
crime against themselves and their property perpetrated by an allegedly
well organized group of Australians, formed a vigilante force. Modelled
on the groups that seemed to be endemic to the mining camps, the 1851
San Francisco vigilantes lynched four men and expelled another twenty
or so. 14
But merchant cooperation could also take less eccentric and dramatic
forms. The fledgling Chamber of Commerce served at times as the
agency through which the merchants dealt with forces and institutions
outside themselves. For example, one practice which increasingly upset
the city's importers was that of dispatching ships from the east with
unspecified manifests. Since mail and newspapers were sent to
California across Panama or Nicaragua, while goods and merchandise
had to travel around Cape Horn, mail would arrive at San Francisco
ahead of good s dispatched at the same time. By reading in the papers and
mail the manifests of the ships that had left the east, a San Francisco
importer could obtain a reasonably clear idea of what items were going
to appear in the San Francisco market. As one of them put the matter,
''We have copies of the manifests of all the different vessels leaving the
Atlantic ports for California, so we keep posted as to the goods on the
way, and can advise our correspondents more understandingly on what
to ship us. " However, with San Francisco overstocked and prices low
from 185 3 on, shippers adopted the practice of putting down on the
manifests something like "merchandise. " In this way, they attempted to
sneak their goods through the seas and make something of a killing for
themselves when the goods hit the uninformed San Francisco market. 15
In June 185 5, one paper remarked that the manifests were getting
"more and more mystifying," and by August the Chamber of Commerce
was trying to do something about the situation. Its secretary was
authorized to correspond with the Secretary of the Treasury and ask him
to order Eastern collectors to require that all manifests be fully specified.
Apparently that remedy did not work out, for by the beginning of the
next year, the Chamber memorialized the legislature on the danger to
commerce of " the extremes of scarcity and oversupply." The State
Senate passed an innocuous resolution of the matter. 16
Another example of merchant cooperation occurred in 185 5. In one
of its regular outbursts against the Chinese, the legislature passed " An
Act to Discourage the Immigration to this State of Persons who cannot
become Citizens thereof.'' It was a very simple act, directed at "any
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vessel arriving in any of the ports of this state. " The law stated that, for
each person on board the ship who was ineligible for California
citizenship. the master, owner, or consignee of the vessel had to pay a
tax of fifty dollars. The Commissioner of Emigrants in San Francisco
was to enforce the act there. Edward McGowan, a local Democrat, held
this office at the time of the passage of the act. In 1856, the KnowNothing legislature asked McGowan to report on his enforcement of the
act. He replied that he had heard that ninety-six Chinese had landed in
the preceding five months, but that "in no instance has the tax been
collected, as every merchant in this place, and all others who know
anything of the laws of the United States, are fully aware of the
unconstitutionality of the said law. "
The Assembly Committee on Mines and Mining Interests, to whom
the reply was referred, was furious and recommended that the Governor
immediately remove McGowan. But the San Francisco merchants, in
whose eyes the Chinese were not competing miners, but potential
customers, memorialized the Mining Committee with a communication
"upholding and sustaining" McGowan's policy. Even though the
communication was summarily rejected by the Committee, and the
Governor did remove McGowan, the memorial itself was significant.
Signed by seventy-six individuals and firms, fully half of whom (thirtyeight) were commission merchants or importers, it was an impressive
display of commercial union. The legislature could also serve as the
outside adversary through its taxation policies, which the San Francisco
merchants, probably in common with almost every group of merchants
ever taxed by anyone, thought excessive. 17
Yet, the constant failure of the many speculative combinations which
were scattered through the period indicated that the merchants of the
city had less success in banding together when a readily perceivable
outside adversary was absent. The constant overstocking afforded a
good example of this inability. The business correspondence of the
period was filled with specific requests for goods, and generalized
complaints about there being too many goods on hand. For example, on
July 30, 185 3 the importing firm of Grogan and Lent wrote a supplier in
Chile, "Business continues quite brisk . .. Flour has advanced more than
was expected: holders of Chile [flour] refuse to sell under $18." Grogan
and Lent predicted that Chile flour would reach $24 and advised their
correspondent to send some "quickly. " Yet, just two weeks later,
Alexander B. Grogan, a partner in Grogan and Lent, wrote the same
supplier and complained that business was very dull. He placed the
blame on "overstocking, " which he vigorously denounc$!d! In sum, San
Francisco merchants were unable to police themselves, but, as the 1851
vigilance committee clearly demonstrated, they were more than willing
to try to police others. 18
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But in 185 6, a series of political events gave the merchants the
opportunity to try to break the commercial rut into which they had fallen.
A brief look at the city's politics is necessary to understand why a
vigilance committee was again formed in the city. The one political
constant in gold rush San Francisco was the Democratic party. Split
between northern and southern wings, the party often squabbled before
election. Only in 1854 did the party formally divide, with both the
northern and southern wings presenting opposing tickets. The strength of
the party lay in the waterfront first ward, which apparently became more
of a working class area from 1849 to 1856. This electoral fact tends to
support the impression conveyed by the sources that the strength of the
party lay among laborers, and made it easier for the importers to regard
part of the political system as controlled by potential adversaries.
The form which opposition to the Democratis assumed was not so
constant. Through 1853, the opposition consisted of the Whigs and a
loose succession of business-dominated "reform" parties, which pushed
a variety of clean government schemes. In 1854 an increased antiCatholic agitation, spurred by the question of state aid to parochial
schools, fostered the fusion of the Whig and business opposition into the
Know-Nothings. Aided by the Democratic split, the Know-Nothings
won the election, but they lost to a reunited Democracy at both the city
and county elections in 1855. In 1856, in an apparent attempt to keep
the Know-Nothing coalition alive, James King's Bulletin, the leading
paper in the city, continued to push religious and eduational questions.
There is some slight evidence to indicate that the city's merchants
tended to cluster in the ranks of the oppostion. In 1851, for example, one
merchant wrote, "They have done me the honor of electing me as a
member of the Whig Central Committee, which I am not sorry of, as it
will give me an acquaintance with a great many merchants of this town
( of whom it is principally composed). " 19
The event that led to the formation of another vigilance committee
occurred in May 1856, when King published an attack on Democratic
Supervisor James Casey. The attack, personal and extravagant, was
typical of the style that had made King the most controversial man in the
city: he stated that, for a variety of political and personal offenses, Casey
"deserved to have his neck stretched." That evening, Casey accosted
King in the streets and shot him. King lingered for a few days, but
eventually died from the wound. After the shooting, Casey's friends the
police immediately whisked him off to jail where, they thought. he would
be safe. Soon an angry crowd, composed of those who did not wish to
stretch Casey's neck, gathered in front of the jail. The militia had be to
called out to disperse the unruly mob, but a core of the city's merchants
quietly took advantage of the excitement and chaos. Literally overnight,
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they organized another vigilance committee. which was dominated by
an executi ve committee composed largely of importers and headed by
importer William T. Coleman, whom Robert Louis Stevenson later
termed .. the lion of the vigilantes ... Within a week. the vigil antes had
overwhelmed the jail and lynched Casey. For the rest of the summer
the y ruled the city, arresting and deporting about thirty men and hanging
three more. (Their erstwhile ally McGowan was on their hit li st, but he
escaped.) In addition. they published a series of reports purporting in the
name of the people to expose crime and corruption. In a typical
broadside. they stated: " For years our citizens endured the great evils
existing in their midst . .. The ballot box was dishonored , the law s were
perverted , justice was prostituted, government was corrupted.' ' 20
But not everyone in the city was convinced that crime and corruption
were the committee ' s main business. John Nugent, editor of the Herald ,
was one such. On the day after Casey shot King. he spoke against a
renewal of vigilantism and quickly found out that the committee meant
busine ss. Within a few hours, over 200 persons cancelled their
subscription to his paper, the auctioneers· association, under pressure
from the importers , withdrew its advertising, and a pile of Hea/ds was
burned by merchants along Front Street, which contained many
wholesale establishments. On the next day, the Herald was only half its
normal size and almost bereft of auction advertising.
But Nugent refused to budge, and the Herald , probably with covert
financial assistance from local Democrats, attacked the vigilantes
throughout the summer. Nugent concentrated on commerce. He
originally argued that the disruption of business that would result from
the merchants ' organizing a vigilance committee would harm business in
the city. Speaking before the execution of Casey. he said,·· A lynch law
execution now would be a lasting detriment to the character of our city.
It would destroy all confidence abroad, and indirectly retard immigration and the investment of capital. '' 21
Through May and June , Nugent constantly pointed out that the
vigilance committee was run by businessmen and kept repeating that the
longer they stayed away from business, the more they would be cutting
their own throats: " It is well known to every person of intelligence that
since the commencement of the present excitement very little bu sine ss
has been done in this city. This is a fact that will be duly weighed at the
East ... a total of a million and a half dollars wasted within the last
month ... He stated that failure might be just what some of the San
Franci sco merchants deserved, pointing out to his readers in the interior
that the men who had organized the vigilance committee were the very
speculators who were constantly trying to corner the market in some
commodity or other and thereby raise price s for the consumers .22
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By the end of June, however, the Herald had adjusted its perspective.
Nugent began to argue that " bad business " was exactly what the
vigilance committee had been after all the time. This had first been
suggested by General Volney Howard in a report to the Governor.
Speaking of the well-known practice of evading jury duty , Howard
argued that, had the city 's businessmen discharged their legal
obligations as good citizens, there would have been no necessity for any
vigilance committee. He went on:
There are in the vigilance comm ittee some merchants of wealth and integrity. There are a
host of others o n the verge of bankruptcy. There arc men unabl e to make their remittances
before this commotion began. and who are now urging its prol ongati on. because it affords
them a plausible excuse for not sending per mail funds which they are unable to remit.

Nugent picked up this argument, for it provided the perfect answer to the
question that had been puzzling him: why were so many businessmen
neglecting business? He argued that the vigilance committee was
interested not only in cancelling the immediate remittance that some
businessmen were perhaps unable to meet. In his eyes, the committee
had a more important goal:
An intelligent and valued correspondent suggests that when the news reaches the city of
New York of the state of things existing in this town, shippers will hesitate to ship large
consignments as heretofore to thi s place, and the comparatively smaller shipments will
cause a rise in the price of many articles of merchandise. Will not man y of the so-ca lled
Committee in that event reap a monstrous profit on various descriptions of goods which
they may have in store '!

In the middle of July, the editor of the Herald presented his seasoned
view of the 1856 vigilance committee:
Several clipper fleets have arrived at this port within the past three months
The re was
no market for them previous to the commencement of the insurreciton in this city. The
immediate effect of recent events will be to destroy the confidence of foreign merchants.
Few will be ready to credit merchants doing business in a city where all law and ci vil rights
have been subverted. Shipments will cease, and as a natural consequence the stoc k of
necessaries now on hand will go up and the mercantile Diet who now sit in such state on
Sacramento Street will reali ze large profits upon their ware s ... The immediate results of
the present movement will be that prices will be inflated. and those who hav e a large stoc k
of those articles on hand will realize a fortune. Who will suffer·>The people. By them the
23
bills will have to be footed.

Nugent's view is most persuasive for a number of reasons. First, it
takes into account the primary commercial fact of the day , that the
market continued to be overstocked. In explaining the behavior of
businessmen, economic factors are not unimportant. Second, the city's
pro-vigilante newspapers. which were ready at a moment's notice to
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defend the committee from any and all charges, generally ignored
Nugent's arguments about the self-interest of the vigilantes. Their
unwillingness to engage him suggests that he was making a very strong
case. Third, unless one is willing to attribute superhuman organizational
ability to the importers who formed the committee, one does have to
account for the fact that thousands of men were effectively mobilized
within a few days. It is plausible that the details of disruption had been
worked out in advance and the the importers were awaiting a pretext for
action. 24 San Francisco merchants had previously been able to mobilize
only in the presence of an outside adversary. And James Casey,
Democratic politician, Irish Catholic, and murderer, was the perfect
adversary , one who could resurrect the Know-Nothing opposition
coalition and tum it into a vigilante force under the direction of the city's
frustrated men of commerce.
If such was the strategy, it did not entirely work. The vigilantes did
win the fall elections, and their government did help businessmen a bit
by reducing taxes . They also abolished annual elections, in an effort to
reduce the importance of sustained political organization. In a typical
·'public interest' ' justification, one of the vigilantes stated that they had
realized that "rotation in office was the primal cause of the adulteration
of public virtue, which, unless it were checked, would bring to bear upon
our republican institutions an almost unendurable strain." 25
But the basic problem, overstocking, was not susceptible to such
solutions. A longer range solution was called for. The l 850' s continued
to be years of economic distress for the importers, and the problem was
alleviated only when the first generation had been winnowed. By 1860,
almost half had left the city. 26
On another level, though, they did succeed. As William T. Sherman
somewhat bitterly recalled, they " controlled the press and wrote their
own history. " 27 On the level of the usable past, they were victorious. For
they left to their city and their nation the idea that urban merchants were
the pre-eminent repositories of public virtue, that, as a group, they were
uniquel y capable of disinterested, selfless, and nonpolitical action. That
was their legacy. their bequest to that generation of businessmenreformers . the Progressives, who followed them . 28
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